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THE SHRINKING CONSTITUTION OF SETTLEMENT
David E. Pozen*
ABSTRACT
Professor Sanford Levinson has famously distinguished between the
“Constitution of Settlement” and the “Constitution of Conversation.” The former
comprises those aspects of the Constitution that are clear, well-established, and
resistant to creative interpretation. The latter comprises those aspects that are subject
to ongoing litigation and debate. Although Americans tend to fixate on the Constitution
of Conversation, Levinson argues that much of what ails our republic is attributable,
at least in part, to the grossly undemocratic and “decidedly nonadaptive” Constitution
of Settlement.
This Article, prepared for a symposium on Levinson’s coauthored book
Democracy and Dysfunction, explains that the Constitution of Settlement is in fact
becoming unsettled, as growing levels of political frustration and polarization have
roused a growing number of actors to seek to challenge or circumvent various pieces
of it. Fundamental reform is now on the table. The Constitution of Conversation,
meanwhile, is becoming ever less conversational. As these developments reflect, the
distinction between Levinson’s two constitutions is significantly more complicated—
and fluid—than his binary implies. Ironically, Levinson is not just a leading critic of
the Constitution of Settlement but also an active participant in its maintenance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the afterword to the 2011 edition of Constitutional Faith and in the 2012
book Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance, Professor
Sanford Levinson introduced a distinction between the “Constitution of
Settlement” and the “Constitution of Conversation.”1 The Constitution of
Settlement comprises those aspects of the Constitution that are clear, wellestablished, and resistant to creative interpretation: for example, the two-senatorsper-state rule.2 Because they are seen as straightforward, these provisions tend to
be taken for granted. The Constitution of Conversation, in contrast, comprises
those aspects of the Constitution that are sufficiently open textured as to invite
ongoing litigation and debate: for example, the Equal Protection Clause.3 The
distinction between the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of
Conversation has been embraced by scholars from diverse disciplines4 and features
prominently in the celebrated constitutional law casebook that Levinson
coauthors.5
1. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 246–54 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH]; SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 19–28 (2012) [hereinafter LEVINSON,
FRAMED].
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State . . . .”).
3. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
4. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Teaching the Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment and the
Constitution of Memory, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 639, 652 (2018) (“Professor Sanford Levinson, in
a pathbreaking work on America’s constitutions, coined the phrases ‘Constitution of
Settlement’ and ‘Constitution of Conversation’ . . . .”); Andrew Arato, Book Review, 20
CONSTELLATIONS 503, 503 (2013) (reviewing LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1) (describing
the distinction as “fruitful” and “the most positive feature” of Framed); John E. Finn, Book
Review, 13 PERSP. ON POL. 162, 163 (2015) (reviewing LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1)
(commending Levinson’s call “to set aside our fascination with the ‘Constitution of
Conversation’ . . . in favor of thinking about the ‘Constitution of Settlement’”); Robert F.
Williams, Unsettling the Settled: Challenging the Great and Not-so-Great Compromises in the
Constitution, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 1151 (2013) (book review) (“Levinson has . . . provided a
fascinating review of the theory behind and the actual operation of our Constitution of
Settlement.”).
5. The distinction between the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of
Conversation is the subject of the first “note” in the current edition of the casebook. See PAUL
BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR & REVA B. SIEGEL,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 23–25 (7th ed.
2018).
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From the moment he put forward this now “famous[]” distinction,6 Levinson
has been an indefatigable critic of the Constitution of Settlement. In scores of
articles, blog posts, and books, he has argued that its structural pillars—from the
Electoral College to congressional bicameralism to the apportionment of senators
to the Article V amendment rules to the presidential veto to the requirement that
the president be a “natural born Citizen”—violate basic principles of democracy
and breed political dysfunction.7 Lawyers like to obsess over relatively
indeterminate phrases such as cruel and unusual or due process. But it is the more
prosaic terms of the Constitution of Settlement that demand our attention, in
Levinson’s telling, as these “static, decidedly nonadaptive aspects”8 of the
constitutional order are destroying any hope of realizing “the magnificent vision”9
that the Framers set forth in the Preamble. To vindicate the Preamble’s promise
today, Levinson asserts that nothing less than a second constitutional convention
is needed, so that Americans can rewrite the canonical document and resolve its
foundational flaws.10
Levinson’s letters in Democracy and Dysfunction repeatedly return to this
theme, with a Trumpian twist. The parts of the Constitution of Settlement that
make lawmaking so difficult, Levinson suggests, have created a perpetual “crisis
of governance,” which in turn creates a hospitable political environment for a
populist demagogue such as Donald Trump.11 And as we all know, the Electoral
College allowed President Trump to ascend to the White House even though
Hillary Clinton received millions more votes.12
Responding to Levinson, Professor Jack Balkin contends that certain
features of the Constitution of Settlement limit President Trump’s ability to do
lasting damage to the republic, for which we should be grateful.13 Balkin further
contends that the most serious defects in our constitutional system can be remedied
through subconstitutional measures, such as a new federal statute allowing
6. Jack Balkin, Dysfunctional Constitution or Regime Change?, BALKINIZATION (Jan.
30, 2013), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/01/dysfunctional-constitution-or-regime.html
[https://perma.cc/CEJ5-UBBZ].
7. See, e.g., LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1, at 119 (Natural Born Citizen Clause); id.
at 133–61 (bicameralism); id. at 148–51 (Senate apportionment); id. at 164–72 (presidential
veto); id. at 178–90 (Electoral College); id. at 331–45 (Article V).
8. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 1, at 249.
9. Id. at 251.
10. See, e.g., id. at 254; LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1, at 391.
11. SANFORD LEVINSON & JACK M. BALKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION 14 (2019);
see also id. at 12–14 (reviewing “some of the primary fault lines or hidden dangers in the
Constitution of Settlement”).
12. Id. at 3, 64, 175.
13. Id. at 70–75, 99.
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multimember districts for the House of Representatives or a new interstate compact
guaranteeing the presidency to the candidate who receives the most votes
nationwide.14 Holding a constitutional convention, accordingly, would be
unnecessary and unwise.15
Balkin’s arguments about the possibilities for constitutional reform under
conditions of functional unamendability gesture toward, and seek to advance, a
phenomenon I wish to highlight: The Constitution of Settlement is becoming
unsettled.16 Not in the books, but in action. That is to say, many different features
of Levinson’s Constitution of Settlement no longer look as “static” as they used to
look, as growing levels of political frustration and polarization have roused a
growing number of actors to seek to challenge or circumvent them without
necessarily pursuing a constitutional amendment. An appreciation of this
phenomenon can help us to assess both Levinson’s thesis and the state of
contemporary constitutional politics.
II. UNSETTLING DEVELOPMENTS
A. Indirect Examples
Some of the ways in which the Constitution of Settlement is becoming
unsettled are indirect. In these areas, politicians, activists, and academics have not,
for the most part, contested the traditional understanding of the relevant
constitutional limits; April Fools’ jokes aside, they have not, say, advanced an
alternative interpretation of Article I, Section 3’s directive that
the Senate “shall be composed of two Senators from each State.”17 Rather, they
have engaged in behaviors that have the purpose or effect of changing the practical
implications of those limits. For example:

14. Id. at 22–23, 199–203.
15. Id. at 199–203.
16. The so-called New Deal Settlement regarding the scope and distribution of the federal

government’s power is also becoming unsettled, at least around the edges, but that is another
story. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017); Lawrence B. Solum,
How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2013).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Fittingly enough, a brilliant April Fools’ Day parody has
Levinson’s foil, Balkin, advancing the off-the-wall claim that “the phrase ‘two Senators from
each state’ is a metonym for ‘a number of Senators that is proportionate to the body that these
Senators represent.’” Lawrence Solum, Balkin on the Senate, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 1,
2010), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/ 2010/04/balkin-on-framework-originalismand-the-senate.html [https://perma.cc/P45N-U2DM].
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 As of this writing, sixteen jurisdictions have signed on to the National
Popular Vote Compact, which would effectively neuter the Electoral
College and nationalize presidential elections if states controlling a
majority of electors were to join it.18 Other ideas for state-level Electoral
College reform seem to be gaining traction as well.19
 Proposals to grant statehood to the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico
through federal legislation have moved from the margins to the
mainstream of the Democratic Party.20 Meanwhile, a proposal to break
up California into three states nearly made it onto the ballot in November
2018.21 These and similar reforms would bring the Senate closer, albeit
only modestly, to the one-person-one-vote norm without disturbing the
two-senators-per-state rule.
 For a variety of reasons,22 recent presidents have wielded the veto—a tool

18. See Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote,
NAT’L
POPULAR
VOTE,
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation
[https://perma.cc/HRN9-RZB7]; see also Jack Torry, Presidential Election: Voters May Get to
Change Way Ohio Awards Electoral Votes, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Apr. 7, 2019),
https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/ohio-voters-may -getchance-way-state-awards-electoral-votes/gbJ7FaaMC1h9QC170MDfAO
[https://
perma.cc/TYJ2-Y75M] (noting that abolishing the Electoral College “has become one of the
rallying cries of at least seven Democratic presidential candidates”).
19. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Want to Fix Presidential Elections? Here’s the Quickest
Way., POLITICO MAG. (May 4, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story
/2019/05/04/electoral-college-reform-2020-226792
[https://perma.cc/9VVQ-ERBA]
(reviewing reform proposals currently “on the table” and recommending “an achievable, shortterm solution” in which as few as five swing states “embrace, via ballot initiatives or legislation,
electoral systems that reward only candidates who win a majority of the vote”).
20. See Marc Caputo, Puerto Rico Emerges as 2020 Campaign Hotspot, POLITICO (Feb.
27,
2019),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/27/puerto-rico-2020-1194114
[https://perma.cc/97LS-DBCV]; Osita Nwanevu, Democrats Push to Make Washington, D.C.,
the Fifty-First State, NEW YORKER (Mar. 10, 2019), https:// www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/democrats-push-to-make-washington-dc-the-fifty-first-state
[https://perma.cc/MK4PY7FE]; see also Katie Windham, The Public Supports Statehood for D.C. and Puerto Rico,
DATA FOR PROGRESS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2019/2/28/thepublic-supports-statehood-for-dc-and-puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/82LL-VS8X] (reporting
January 2019 survey results finding that a supermajority of Democratic voters and a “clear”
majority of all Americans support D.C. and especially Puerto Rican statehood).
21. See California Proposition 9, Three States Initiative (2018), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_9,_Three_States_Initiative_(2018)
[https
://perma.cc/VRV2-RVEP].
22. See Alan Greenblatt, 5 Reasons Vetoes Have Gone Out of Style, NPR (May 9, 2013),
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2013/02/22/172698717/five-reasons-vetoes-havegone-out-of-style [https://perma.cc/M5W5-M9Y3].
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Levinson describes as “very anti-democratic”23—significantly less
often than their twentieth-century predecessors: fewer than two times per
year since the turn of the millennium.24 (Perhaps unhappily from
Levinson’s perspective, recent presidents have also been relying less on
their enumerated power “to make Treaties,”25 subject to two-thirds Senate
approval, and relying much more on congressional–executive
agreements, sole executive agreements, and legally nonbinding political
agreements.26)
 Since the 1970s, congressional leaders have increasingly resorted to
“unorthodox lawmaking,” bypassing committees and conferences and
making greater use of omnibus vehicles and informal bargaining
practices.27 These deviations from the textbook legislative process have
allowed Congress to remain reasonably productive in the face of rising
partisan rancor,28 mitigating the efficiency costs of Article I, Section 7’s
bicameralism and presentment requirements.29

23. Sanford Levinson, Against the Veto., NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 8, 2006),
https://newrepublic.com/article/64983/against-the-veto [https://perma.cc/67RY-F2KJ].
24. See Leah Libresco, Comparing Obama’s Veto Rate to Other Recent Presidents’,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 23, 2015), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/comparing-obamasveto-rate-to-other-recent-presidents [https://perma.cc/6JD8-PEJS]; Gerhard Peters & John T.
Woolley,
Presidential
Vetoes,
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/data/presidential-vetoes [https://perma.cc/ YZZ8NUEC] (last updated Dec. 31, 2019).
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
26. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1212–23 (2018) (estimating that “approximately 94% of [legally
binding] U.S. international agreements made in the last several decades . . . are not treaties” and
explaining that legally nonbinding political commitments have proliferated as well).
27. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (5th ed. 2016).
28. Definitions of legislative productivity are debatable, of course, but at least if measured
(crudely) by raw numbers of bills and resolutions introduced and passed each session,
congressional productivity has remained fairly stable in recent decades. See Drew DeSilver, A
Productivity Scorecard for the 115th Congress: More Laws than Before, but Not More
Substance, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 25, 2019), https:// www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/01/25/a-productivity-scorecard-for-115th-congress [https://perma.cc/E8B9-DCSX];
Legislative Productivity in Congress and Workload,
BROOKINGS
INST.,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Chpt-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW47DAUR];
Statistics
and
Historical
Comparison,
GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics [https://perma.cc/9BUH-L2CL].
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3; cf. Sanford Levinson, Compromise and
Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 821, 828 (2011) (observing that “American bicameralism,
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 While the Supreme Court still refuses to declare partisan gerrymandering
unconstitutional30 and the Elections Clause still gives “the Legislature”
of “each State” broad authority over redistricting,31 the Court ruled in
2015 that voters may, by ballot initiative, force their state to adopt an
independent commission for the drawing of all districts.32 Assisted by this
ruling, grassroots activists have made significant strides since 2015 in
promoting anti-gerrymandering reforms.33
B. Direct Examples
Other ways in which the Constitution of Settlement is becoming unsettled
are somewhat more direct. In these areas, politicians, activists, and academics have
not tried to find clever workarounds for disputed constitutional arrangements, so
much as to alter the arrangements themselves through legal reinterpretation or
political action. For example:
 The Senate filibuster rules had seemed so entrenched for so long that both
Levinson and Balkin characterized them in prior writings as part of the
Constitution of Settlement.34 No more. Senate majorities eliminated the
unlike many bicameral systems around the world, gives each house a death-lock over any
legislation passed by the other” and asserting that “[w]e pay the costs [of this arrangement]
every day”).
30. For the most recent, and seemingly definitive, refusal, see Rucho v. Common Cause,
139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (“We conclude that partisan gerrymandering claims present
political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of chusing Senators.”).
32. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2671–
77 (2015).
33. See Nancy Martorano Miller, Keith E. Hamm, Maria Aroca & Ronald D. Hedlund,
An Alternative Route to Voting Reform: The Right to Vote, Voter Registration, Redistricting and
U.S. State Constitutions, 49 PUBLIUS 465, 467 (2019) (reviewing “recent efforts by voting and
election reformers to utilize state constitutions in their efforts to challenge restrictive voting
laws as well as partisan gerrymandering”); Michael Wines, Drive Against Gerrymandering
Finds New Life in Ballot Initiatives, N.Y. TIMES (July 23,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/us/gerrymandering-states.html
[https://
perma.cc/HA9G-NKRV] (discussing a “remarkable” burst of anti-gerrymandering reform
activity).
34. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1, at 160; Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco:
Why the American Political System Is Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1164 (2014). As
Levinson noted at the time, “[n]o one argues that the Constitution requires” the filibuster.
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filibuster for all non–Supreme Court nominations in 2013 and for
Supreme Court nominations in 2017.35 The legislative filibuster may
meet the same fate shortly.36
 “Suddenly,” Professor Stephen Carter remarked in late 2018, “everybody
wants to explore term limits for Supreme Court justices.”37 Carter may
have put the point hyperbolically, but prominent commentators and
advocacy groups on the left and the right now tout an idea that used to be
considered an academic pipe dream,38 as do ordinary Americans in
surveys.39 A variety of other court-reform ideas are also being actively
LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1, at 160. His decision to categorize the filibuster, nonetheless,
as part of the Constitution of Settlement sits uneasily with his identification of that Constitution
with “clear textual commands,” LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 1, at 249—a
point to which I will return below. See infra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
35. See Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for
a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 97–110 (2017) (describing these developments and their
political context).
36. See Burgess Everett, Coming Soon: The Death of the Filibuster, POLITICO (Apr. 3,
2019),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/03/senate-republicans-filibuster-1250082
[https://perma.cc/5FWM-Z87Y]; Paul Kane, With Little Fallout from Nuclear Option, Senate’s
Legislative
Filibuster
Is
in
Jeopardy,
WASH. POST
(Apr.
2,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-little-fallout-from-nuclear-option-senate
slegislative-filibuster-is-in-jeopardy/2019/04/02/8d8bc7c4-554c-11e9-aa83-504f086bf5d6
_story.html [https://perma.cc/G9FZ-59ZG]; Rebecca Shabad, Frank Thorp V & Ali Vitali,
Elizabeth Warren Calls for Eliminating Senate Filibuster for Legislation, NBC NEWS (Apr. 5,
2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/elizabeth-warren-calls-eliminating-senatefilibuster-legislation-n991301 [https://perma.cc/D3JW-3QQ8].
37. Stephen L. Carter, The Supreme Court Needs Term Limits, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-supreme-courtterm-limits-brett-kavanaugh-life-tenure-1009-story.html [https://perma.cc/NHE4-XNDB].
38. See Marcia Coyle, Term Limits, 11 Justices, Balancing & More: Reshaping SCOTUS
Is in Vogue, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 16, 2018), available at https://finance.yahoo.com/news/termlimits-11-justices-balancing-053756585.html [https ://perma.cc/V3YL-PRGS]; Melissa Heelan
Stanzione, Kavanuagh Saga Amplifies Call for Supreme Court Term Limits, BLOOMBERG L.
(Oct. 13, 2018), https://news. bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/kavanaugh-saga-amplifies-callfor-supreme-court-ter m-limits [https://perma.cc/PP3Q-BZK4]. Balkin and Levinson have long
supported term limits for the justices. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Reforming the Supreme Court,
BALKINIZATION (Feb. 13, 2009), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/02/reforming-supremecourt.html [https://perma.cc/YU2N-AG3M].
39. See UVA Ctr. for Pol., New Poll: Americans Strongly Support Term Limits for Judges,
SABATO’S CRYSTAL BALL (July 19, 2018), http://www.centerforpolitics.org/
crystalball/articles/new-poll-americans-strongly-support-term-limits-for-judges [https://
perma.cc/D4CK-37YB]; Lydia Wheeler, Majority of Americans Support Term Limits for
Supreme Court Justices, New Poll Finds, HILL (Nov. 1, 2018), https://thehill.com/
regulation/court-battles/414264-majority-of-americans-support-term-limits-for-supreme
court-justices [https://perma.cc/8GKT-7QNS].
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explored.40 Supporters of term limits, moreover, are coming to insist that
they could be implemented through ordinary legislation, on the view that
Article III’s Good Behavior Clause should not be read to require life
tenure as an active-duty justice.41
 Although still a fringe position, constitutional scholars have begun to
suggest that the Natural Born Citizen Clause may have been
implicitly “repealed” by the Fourteenth Amendment (which, as
construed by the Supreme Court, places sharp limits on national-origin
discrimination).42 More saliently, controversies over Senator John
McCain’s and Senator Ted Cruz’s presidential eligibility alternately
solidified and undermined support for the position that children of U.S.
citizens born abroad are natural born citizens within the meaning of the
Clause.43
 In October 2018, President Trump announced he was preparing an
executive order that would deny birthright citizenship to children born in

40. See, e.g., Josh Lederman, Inside Pete Buttigieg’s Plan to Overhaul the Supreme Court,
NBC NEWS (June 3, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/inside-petebuttigieg-s-plan-overhaul-supreme-court-n1012491 [https://perma.
cc/H4L7-6YBD] (explaining that Democratic presidential candidates Pete Buttigieg and Beto
O’Rourke have expressed interest in the “Balanced Court” plan proposed by Professors Daniel
Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman); Pema Levy, How Court-Packing Went from a Fringe Idea to a
Serious
Democratic
Proposal,
MOTHER
JONES
(Mar.
22,
2019),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/court-packing-2020 [https://perma.cc/ 4NA2TDET] (describing the possibility of “packing” the Court as “now a major theme of the
Democratic primary and possibly the general election”).
41. I myself have noted the plausibility of this view. See David E. Pozen, Hardball and/as
Anti-Hardball, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 949, 951–52 (2019).
42. See, e.g., Paul A. Clark, Limiting the Presidency to Natural Born Citizens Violates
Due Process, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1343, 1343–65 (2006); Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Could
Arnold Schwarzenegger Run for President Now?, 6 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 331, 332–55 (2005);
Josh Blackman, Did the 14th Amendment (1868) Nullify the “Natural Born Citizen” Clause
(1789)?,
JOSH
BLACKMAN’S
BLOG
(Mar.
24,
2015),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/03/24/did-the-14th-amendment-1868-nullify-the-nat uralborn-citizen-clause-1789 [https://perma.cc/ZWH2-FPEF].
43. See Christopher W. Schmidt & Matthew T. Bodie, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause,
Popular Constitutionalism, and Ted Cruz’s Eligibility Question, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
ARGUENDO 36, 42–46 (2016) (explaining that “what appeared to be a stable academic [and
political] consensus took shape” during McCain’s presidential run “around the idea that those
who are foreign born to U.S. citizen parents meet the requirements of the clause,” but that this
apparent consensus began to fray when challenged by then-presidential candidate Donald
Trump in 2015 and 2016).
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the United States to parents unlawfully in the country,44 notwithstanding
the Department of Justice’s consistent stance that such a move would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause.45 President
Trump appears to have abandoned this plan, at least for the time being,
but
his
revisionist
understanding of the Citizenship Clause may yet become Republican
Party orthodoxy.46
Many of the above-listed developments have the potential to make our
constitutional system fairer and more rational by Levinson’s lights. Yet as this last
example reflects, efforts to reshape the patterns and principles of governance can
cut in the opposite direction. The fact of constitutional norm change is, in itself,
normatively ambiguous.47
Whether for good or for ill, all of this constitutional “unsettling” has been
occurring outside the confines of Article V. Balkin is right that “the Constitution
of Settlement can be changed . . . without a constitutional amendment, much less
a new constitutional convention.”48 To varying degrees across different domains,
44. Jonathan Swan & Stef W. Kight, Exclusive: Trump Targeting Birthright Citizenship
with Executive Order, AXIOS (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.axios.com/trump-birthrightcitizenship-executive-order-0cf4285a-16c6-48f2-a933-bd71fd72ea82.html
[htt
ps://perma.cc/8C64-VJ4G].
45. See, e.g., Legislation Denying Citizenship at Birth to Certain Children Born in the
U.S., 19 Op. O.L.C. 340 (1995).
46. See Ryan Bort, Fox News Immediately Pivots to Birthright Citizenship Mode,
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/foxnews-birthright-citizenship-749844 [https://perma.cc/BG8E-B4A6] (“After Trump reignited
the birthright debate Tuesday morning, the [Fox News] network gladly crammed its
programming with talking heads defending it from every angle . . . .”); Emily Ekins, What
Americans Think About Birthright Citizenship, CATO INST. (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.cato.org/blog/what-americans-think-about-birthright-citizenship
[https://
perma.cc/6WAM-P7JN] (reporting November 2018 survey results finding that over 60 percent
of Republicans “oppose birthright citizenship for children born to mothers in the country
illegally”); Niels Lesniewski, Lindsey Graham Seconds Trump Proposal to End Birthright
Citizenship, ROLL CALL (Oct. 30, 2018), https:// www.rollcall.com/news/politics/lindseygraham-trump-birthright-citizenship [https:// perma.cc/DZ5Z-QUCQ] (“Sen. Lindsey Graham,
a previous advocate of bipartisan immigration overhaul and who could be the chairman of the
Judiciary Committee in the next Congress, is praising President Donald Trump’s effort to roll
back birthright citizenship by executive fiat.”).
47. See Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65
UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1445–50 (2018); Jedediah Britton-Purdy, Normcore, DISSENT (Summer
2018), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/normcore-trump-resistance-books-crisis-ofdemocracy [https://perma.cc/C669-SGVX].
48. Balkin, supra note 34, at 1164–65. On the general phenomenon of constitutional
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such change is always already underway.
C. Meanwhile, About That Constitution of Conversation
At the same time that the Constitution of Settlement has become less settled,
the Constitution of Conversation has become less, well, conversational. Partisan
polarization and the rise of the conservative legal movement, among other factors,
have helped to reshape—and bifurcate—constitutional discourse. A wealth of
qualitative evidence indicates that “[i]n addition to becoming more ideologically
coherent and distinct, the parties have also become more constitutionally coherent
and distinct over the past several decades.”49 Along the way, “Americans on both
the left and the right . . . have come to view the Constitution not as an aspirational
statement

of shared principles and a bulwark against tribalism, but as a cudgel with which to
attack [political] enemies.”50
Professor Julian Nyarko, Professor Eric Talley, and I recently enlisted
computational methods to study the evolution of constitutional debate on the floor
of Congress. On a variety of metrics, we found that Democratic and Republican
members are now talking past each other in their constitutional rhetoric to a greater
degree than ever before.51 The same is true of liberals and conservatives (identified
as such by their voting behaviors).52 Since around 1980, it has become easier and
easier for a machine-learning classifier to predict what sort of congressperson is
speaking about the Constitution, based solely on the text of the remarks.53
The “Constitution of Conversation” evokes an image of a public sphere in
which divergent constitutional views are debated, amicably and openly, in pursuit
of common judgments and common solutions. The discursive environment
propositions moving over time from “off-the-wall” to “on-the-wall,” see J ACK M. BALKIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 12, 61, 69–70, 88, 119, 177–83 (2011).
49. Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM.
L. REV. 915, 965 (2018).
50. Amy Chua & Jed Rubenfeld, The Threat of Tribalism, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/the-threat-of-tribalism/568342
[https://perma.cc/JJ5G-446A].
51. See David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley & Julian Nyarko, A Computational Analysis of
Constitutional Polarization, 105 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 27–38),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3351339 [https://perma.cc/EZ8E-9TND].
52. Id. (manuscript at 31–32).
53. Id. (manuscript at 29–36).
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suggested by these findings, however, is more Schmittian than Habermasian.54 If
Levinson arguably paints too grim a picture of the Constitution of Settlement, he
may paint too rosy a picture of the Constitution of Conversation. Both of his
metaphors seem increasingly inapt.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Constitutional movements and zeitgeists are hard to pin down. The list of
unsettling developments sketched in Part II might be challenged or qualified in any
number of respects, perhaps most obviously on the ground
that some of the examples appear unlikely to result in fundamental change.
I hope others will refine and revise the list. But if this Article’s overarching claim
about the intensifying pressures being placed on the Constitution of Settlement is
sound, it would seem to have significant implications for Levinson’s thesis and for
the country. Let me close by suggesting a few.
First, the distinction between the Constitution of Settlement and the
Constitution of Conversation is more complicated—and fluid—than Levinson
implies. On multiple occasions, Levinson has described himself as differentiating
“sharply”55 or “very sharply”56 between the two. The norm-bending behaviors
cataloged above suffice to show that the current constitutional landscape is quite a
bit fuzzier.
Nor was there ever any sharp boundary here. As Professors Curtis Bradley
and Neil Siegel have documented in detail, the perceived clarity and constraining
force of any given piece of constitutional text are “constructed” to a significant
degree by constitutional argumentation and other social practices.57 Those same
practices can destabilize preexisting perceptions of clarity and constraint, just as
they can stabilize such perceptions. Even if the words of a constitution never
change, the mix of elements that are thought to be settled versus unsettled may
54. Compare, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON
DISCOURSE ETHICS 54–56 (Ciaran P. Cronin trans., 1993) (outlining conditions for an “ideal
speech situation”), with CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26–33 (George
Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press, expanded ed. 2007) (1932) (depicting politics as a life-anddeath struggle between “friend” and “enemy”).
55. Sanford Levinson, On the Inevitability of “Constitutional Design,” 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
249, 250 (2016).
56. Sanford Levinson, Why Strauder v. West Virginia Is the Most Important Single Source
of Insight on the Tensions Contained Within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 603, 609 n.20 (2018).
57. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the
Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213 (2015).
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vary over time. In any given period, some patterns of constitutional behavior and
some propositions of constitutional law will be in the process of becoming more
widely accepted and deeply entrenched—consider, for example, legal recognition
of same-sex marriage in recent years—while other patterns and propositions will
be in the process of becoming increasingly contested.58
Responding to this point, Levinson suggests that the distinction between the
Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution
of Conversation
is not meant to be interpretive or “linguistic[]” in nature but
rather “is relentlessly pragmatic.”59 This suggestion is belied, however, by
Levinson’s persistent conflation of settledness with “clear and determinate”
constitutional language.60 Semantic clarity in an authoritative legal text may well
contribute to social settlement. But a relentlessly pragmatic approach would have
to consider the possibility that certain textually unspecified institutions, such as
same-sex marriage, are at this point significantly more settled than certain textually
specified ones, such as the Electoral College. There may be a perverse irony to
Levinson’s program, insofar as his fatalistic laments about the Constitution of
Settlement reinforce perceptions of fixity and thereby make those lamented parts
of our constitutional order that much more immune from creative (re)construction
than they might otherwise be. Levinson, in other words, is not merely an external
critic of the Constitution of Settlement but an active participant in its maintenance.
Second, Levinson needs a theory of democracy to ground his critique of the
Constitution of Settlement.61 He maintains that institutions such as the Senate and
58. The title of this Article is therefore potentially misleading, in that the Constitution of
Settlement is both shrinking and expanding. My primary focus here is on the shrinking side of
the ledger.
59. Sandy Levinson, Reply to Critics—Part Three: David Pozen on the Potential
Malleability of the Constitution of Settlement, BALKINIZATION (June 9, 2019),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/06/reply-to-critics-part-three-david-pozen.html [https:
//perma.cc/D6KZ-HTV9].
60. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1, at 19; see, e.g., id. at 22 (identifying the
Constitution of Settlement with “self-enforcing provisions” that have a “clear meaning”); id. at
23 (identifying the Constitution of Settlement with “clear constitutional commands”).
61. His critique might also be deepened by greater attention to comparative constitutional
development and design. Cf. David Schleicher, Things Aren’t Going That Well over There
Either: Party Polarization and Election Law in Comparative Perspective, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 433, 435–38 (arguing that the United States’ recent governance problems have been “driven
by changes in the amount and type of radical opinion” common across Western democracies
and that “it will prove difficult to use the tools of institutional design to make democracy work
well when a substantial part of the population would rather hold out for fundamental change”);
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the Electoral College are fundamentally undemocratic and must be reformed for
that
reason. President Trump and his supporters
deny the

premise. They are apt to extol the “genius”62 of these institutions and to assail
birthright citizenship as an “undemocratic”63 “scam.”64
I agree with Levinson on these matters and disagree with President Trump.
But appeals to “democracy,” or to subsidiary principles such as majority rule or
one person one vote,65 will not tell us which elements in our constitutional system
deserve to be celebrated and which deserve to be overhauled without an account
of democracy’s purposes, preconditions, and normative priority. Different
conceptions of democracy may point toward different problems and solutions.
Third, Levinson needs a theory of popular sovereignty or collective will
formation to ground his call for a new constitutional convention.66 Even if
Gerard N. Magliocca, Another Rendezvous with Destiny, BALKINIZATION (May 7, 2019),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/05/another-rendezvous-with-destiny.html
[https://
perma.cc/YE82-5ZAQ] (“If the United States is just one of many dysfunctional democracies,
then that suggests that [Levinson’s] focus on the hard-wired provisions of our Constitution as
the source of our problems is incorrect. Other national constitutions with very different
provisions are faring no better.”).
62. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 15, 2016, 7:40
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/798521053551140864?lang=en [https://
perma.cc/5RDX-SN89] (“The Electoral College is actually genius in that it brings all states,
including the smaller ones, into play.”).
63. See, e.g., Michael Anton, Trump Should End Birthright Citizenship. It Shouldn’t Have
Existed
in
the
First
Place.,
USA
TODAY
(Nov.
1,
2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/11/01/framers-never-wanted-birthrightcitizenship/1831577002 [https://perma.cc/U475-DJUH] (“There is nothing in the Constitution
or in statute law that gives the federal government authority to grant citizenship to people not
entitled to it. Federal agencies simply do it . . . . It’s one of thousands of examples of our
runaway, undemocratic, unelected bureaucracy acting in concert with liberal interests.”).
64. See, e.g., Tucker Carlson, Tucker Carlson: Birthright Citizenship Is a Scam. There Is
No Other Word for It, FOX NEWS (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tuckercarlson-birthright-citizenship-is-a-scam-there-is-no-other-word-for-it [https://perma.cc/P6PZXR7E] (“This is a scam. There is no other word for it.”).
65. On some of the persistent conceptual and empirical ambiguities of the one-personone-vote norm, see generally Nathaniel Persily, Who Counts for One Person, One Vote?, 50
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1395 (2017).
66. Arguably, Levinson also needs a theory of constitutionalism to justify his support for
revising the canonical document rather than scrapping it altogether or “systematically
ignor[ing]” its commands. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 5
(2012).
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Levinson is correct that the Constitution of Settlement is undemocratic, it does not
necessarily follow that an Article V convention (or any other sort of convention)
is the best method for remedying its defects. In practice, a convention might lead
to an even worse Constitution. As Professor David Super has emphasized, much
depends
on
how
a
convention
is
organized
and
run,67 matters to which progressives such as Levinson have thus far devoted
little attention. In principle, it is not entirely clear why a constitutional
convention should enjoy greater democratic or moral legitimacy than the more
diffuse and informal processes of constitutional reform that are happening all
around us. Levinson never explores, for example, whether and under what
conditions a convention would be more or less likely than ordinary politics to
generate inclusive forms of representation or creative coalition building.
What’s so special, in short, about a constitutional convention? Unless
Levinson can offer a good nonconsequentialist answer—and one may be
available68—why shouldn’t those who are troubled by the constitutional status quo
simply make a practical political judgment about where their reform efforts are
likely to have the greatest impact? That calculus, presumably, will often point them
away from Article V.
IV. CONCLUSION
A final implication of the unsettling of the Constitution of Settlement should
concern us all: It raises the stakes of electoral politics. Those stakes are high, of
course, even in periods of relative constitutional quiescence. In a period when
previously taken-for-granted constitutional institutions and distributions are
increasingly subject to revision through subconstitutional means, they are higher
still. More first principles of governance are up for grabs.
This observation is alarming but also invigorating. Counterpoised against
President Trump’s own reactionary reform agenda, the rapid mainstreaming of
proposals to end partisan gerrymandering, nationalize the presidential vote, rein in
67. See David A. Super, The Hidden Threat to Our Constitution, ACS EXPERT F. (June
19,
2019),
https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/the-hidden-threat-to-our-constitution
[https://perma.cc/E7BH-DSUA].
68. Cf. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism,
127 YALE L.J. 664, 681 (2018) (book review) (explaining that constitutional lawmaking through
popular “authorship, revision, or reaffirmation,” as in a referendum or special convention, was
regarded in the Founding Era “as the sole possible form of democratic self-rule in the large and
complex societies of political modernity”). Levinson and I share the view that Grewal and
Britton-Purdy’s recovery of this strand of Founding-Era thought poses a powerful challenge for
contemporary constitutional theory.

Pozen 68.2

350

8/20/2020 9:00 PM

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 68

the Supreme Court, and grant statehood to the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico strike me as hopeful developments. “Fundamental political and constitutional
reform is now a realistic possibility”69 to a degree that seemed implausible even
five years ago. Levinson’s conceit of a Constitution of Settlement underscores just
how
transformative—how reconstitutive of our democracy—these sorts of structural
changes could be. His contempt for that Constitution underscores just how overdue
they are.

69. Stephen Griffin, On Democracy and Dysfunction, BALKINIZATION (May 14, 2019),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/05/on-democracy-and-dysfunction.html
[https://
perma.cc/G3FN-HLQ9].

